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Recent years have seen global food prices rise and become more volatile. Price surges in 2008 and 2011 held
devastating consequences for hundreds of millions of people and negatively impacted many more. Today one
billion people are hungry. The issue is a high priority for many international agencies and national governments. At
the Cannes Summit in November 2011, the G20 leaders agreed to implement five objectives aiming to mitigate
food price volatility and protect vulnerable persons. To succeed, the global community must now translate these
high level policy objectives into practical actions. In this paper, we describe challenges and unresolved dilemmas
before the global community in implementing these five objectives. The paper describes recent food price volatility
trends and an evaluation of possible causes. Special attention is given to climate change and water scarcity, which
have the potential to impact food prices to a much greater extent in coming decades. We conclude the world
needs an improved knowledge base and new analytical capabilities, developed in parallel with the implementation
of practical policy actions, to manage food price volatility and reduce hunger and malnutrition. This requires major
innovations and paradigm shifts by the global community.
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People are becoming increasingly dependent on global and
regional markets for the supply of food. In 1961 imports of
cereals in global markets averaged at 26 kilograms per per-
son per year. By 2009 this had increased to 46 kilograms
per person per year; a 77 percent increase over five decades
[1]. There are few published estimates on the extent of
worldwide subsistence production versus market depend-
ency. Our rapidly urbanizing world has 3.5 billion people,
or 50.5 percent of the global population, living in cities [2].
This urban population is highly reliant on markets for the
provision of food. One early estimate suggests that in
developing-country rural areas around half the population
are smallholder farmers with up to three hectares of crop-
land [3]. Many in the remaining population would rely on
markets to some extent. Household expenditure on food,
as a percentage of total expenditure, is 58.7 in India, 60.6
in Indonesia, 74.8 in Kenya and 81.6 in Rwanda [4].* Correspondence: Stefan.Hajkowicz@csiro.au
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These observations suggest that food price movements
in global and regional markets have a significant impact
on hunger. The Food and Agriculture Organization
(FAO) global food price index represents a basket of
major food groups weighted by average export shares. In
February 2011, this index surged 41 percent over eight
months to an all time high of 238 points. In addition to
overall increases, food prices have become more volatile.
In 2007/2008 the world experienced another unusually
rapid surge in food prices. The true impacts on the
world’s poor are unknown. Some estimates suggest that
between 75 and 130 million additional people suffered
malnutrition [5]. From 2003 to 2007, the number of
undernourished people increased from some 848 million
to 923 million, largely because of the food-price crisis
during this period [6]. Today almost one billion people
are undernourished worldwide [7]. The situation has ur-
gent regional dimensions. At the time of writing this
paper, UNICEF estimates 320,000 children in East Africa
are severely malnourished and at risk of death unless
they receive help [8].ral Ltd. This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative
ommons.org/licenses/by/2.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and
iginal work is properly cited.
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and criticality of food price volatility. It was given attention
at the G20 meetings in Paris on 22 and 23 June 2011 and
in Cannes on 3 and 4 November 2011 with national gov-
ernments agreeing to action. The International Food Policy
Research Institute [9], the World Bank, the Organization
for Economic Cooperation and Development, the Food and
Agriculture Organization and other branches of the United
Nations are a few of the many international agencies with
publications and policy statements on food price volatility
[10]. The issue has also been investigated by national gov-
ernments [11,12]. However, since the devastating 2008
surge, prices have risen even more and remain highly un-
stable. The problem is far from solved and is likely to re-
main a high priority for the world over the coming decade.
High and volatile food prices
Both high and volatile prices create challenges for policy
makers and the global community (Figure 1). Food price
volatility is the extent to which food prices change over
time. It is measured by price variation. We base our def-
inition of price variation on the interagency report to
the G20 led by the FAO [10].
If pt is the price of a food commodity in time period t
(where t can represent hours, days, months, years etc.)
then price variation (v) may be defined as:
v ¼ pt  pt1
pt1
ð1Þ
When the absolute value of v is large, we have high
variation and volatile prices. When the absolute value of
v is small, we have low variation and more stable prices.
In practice, economists often measure volatility usingFigure 1 World food price index (Food and Agriculture Organizationthe standard deviation of logarithmic prices over con-
secutive time intervals [13]. More detailed definitions of
price volatility and related terms are contained in
Appendix A of the inter-agency report to the G20 [10].
Volatile prices create uncertainty and risk for farmers,
traders, wholesalers, retailers, consumers and govern-
ments [14]. Risk can dampen investment which, in turn,
can decrease production. Price increases are associated
with hunger and malnutrition among the world’s poor
people [10]. Analysts often refer to sudden, large and
unexpected price increases as “surges”. Recent research
finds that high food prices, but not necessarily price
volatility, is associated with political unrest, particularly
in low income countries [15,16]. This paper is concerned
with both price volatility and price increases. However,
when referring to “volatility” the G20 objectives are typ-
ically focused on the price peaks and surges, as opposed
to troughs, because the peaks are associated with hunger
and political instability and prompt a policy response.
The recent price surges of 2008 and 2011 are widely con-
sidered “global crises” [17]. One possibility is that the world
is experiencing a short and temporary period of high and
volatile prices. Another possibility is the current situation
persists or worsens over the coming decade. Price volatili-
ties of the most important grains have increased in recent
years and there is likelihood of further sharp price move-
ments [13]. The Organization for Economic Cooperation
and Development (OECD) and FAO forecast world wheat
and rice price increases of 14 and 35 percent by 2020 [14].
Additional pressure stems from highly variable energy
prices, which are transmitted into food markets [17].
Some research concludes that future decades will see
more food price spikes and the alleviation of hunger willAnnual real food price index 2002 to 2004= 100).
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governments [18]. Several global trends create concerns.
The world population is forecast to grow from 7 billion
persons currently to 9.3 billion by 2050 [19]. Income
growth in Asia is resulting in increased protein con-
sumption, which requires greater land and energy
inputs. Meat consumption in developing countries has
been growing at over five percent per year over the last
few decades with an expectation of continued future
growth [20]. It is estimated that 12 million hectares of
productive agricultural land, capable of producing 20
million tons of grain, are lost each year to land degrad-
ation [21]. Future food production is likely to be
impacted by more frequent and severe weather events
associated with climate change [22].
Other commodity markets are also experiencing un-
stable prices. The forces that drive food price move-
ments are similar to those that drive energy and mineral
commodity price movements [23,24]. The previous dec-
ade has seen commodity prices increase to an extent not
experienced for the past 40 years. The price growth has
been accompanied by an increase in volatility across
most commodities [25]. The United Nations Conference
on Trade and Development’s (UNCTAD) global com-
modity price instability index (Figure 2) shows the latter
half of the previous decade (2006 to 2010) experienced
greater volatility than the first half (2001 to 2005). The
instability index is measured as the percentage of devi-
ation of commodity prices from their exponential trend
levels for a given time period.
At this stage, there are no data providing evidence of a
long-term shift in commodities’ markets. Analysis of com-
modity price movements over centuries, since the year
1700 until now, finds no evidence of a permanentFigure 2 Commodity price instability in the previous decade. Data souvolatility increase over history [27]. The UNCTAD data
available since 1960 also reveal no long-term trend other
than a period of increased price stability during the 1960s
compared to subsequent decades. Nevertheless, food
prices today are higher than they have been for decades
and the issue is associated with widespread human suffer-
ing and political unrest. Food price increases and price
volatility are likely to stay high on the political agenda for
some time to come.
Causes of food price surges
An ability to mitigate the consequences of food price
surges hinges upon our understanding of the causes.
Food price movements are caused by myriad drivers of
supply and demand (Figure 3). In addition to supply and
demand is a poorly understood speculative, or “bubble”,
component. A vast body of research has been conducted
into the causes of food price movements and, in particu-
lar, the recent 2008 food price surge [5,12,13,17,28].
Many global agencies and national governments have
also explored the issue [9,11,14,29]. Nevertheless, under-
standing of the causes of food price movements remains
partial and contested. The 2011 price surge, higher than
in 2008, revealed additional possible causes, which are
still finding their way into the research literature. A
comprehensive listing of all factors which potentially
cause food price movements would contain hundreds of
entries. In this section, we explore arguments for and
against some of the major proposed theories.
Low food stocks
Food prices are particularly sensitive to supply shifts when
stocks are low [30]. A review of the causes of food price
surges for the UK Government states (p120) “if a singlerce: United Nations Conference on Trade and Development [26].
Figure 3 A systems model of possible factors influencing food price movements and hunger.
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spikes, it has to be low stocks” [12]. The same study finds
that 42 percent of the variance in food prices during 2006
to 2008 is explained by low stock to use ratios. Stocks
were at low levels in the lead up to the 1973 and 2008
food price surges. However, it may be questioned whether
low food stocks are a cause or consequence of price
increases [28]. In 2006, global food stocks, especially
wheat, were at their lowest level since the early 1980s [9].
It is possible that factors constraining supply, such as
drought in Australia, led to higher utilization of storage
ratios in the lead up to the 2008 price surge. From this
perspective, low stocks are a consequence of underlying
supply and demand forces which cause food price volatil-
ity. Regardless of whether it is a cause or consequence, it
is clear from previous research that food stock to use
ratios play an important role [30,31].
Biofuel production
One percent of the world’s arable land is devoted to bio-
fuel production. By 2030 this is projected to become 2.5
to 3.8 percent under low and high estimates [32]. The
growth in biofuel production will result from marketforces and from government subsidies. There is a wide-
spread view that biofuel production, and subsidies, in-
crease the severity of food price surges [9,33-35]. Some
recent studies have examined the impact of biofuel pro-
duction on the 2008 food price spike. One of these
employs a price dynamic supply and demand model to
find that the “underlying upward trend” in food prices is
due to increasing demand for ethanol [36]. An earlier
analysis of time series data relating to global food prices
and biofuel production finds no direct long-run relation-
ship and “limited if any” short run relationship [37]. An-
other study, using similar methods, finds that biofuel
production had a 3 to 30 percent contribution to the
2008 food price spike [38]. In the future, rising energy
prices, responding to growing global energy demand,
will boost the demand for biofuel. This may be offset
somewhat by the use of second generation biofuels (for
example, cellulosic ethanol), which are produced from
non-food crop biomass. Nevertheless, any type of biofuel
production is likely to place at least some upward pres-
sure on food prices because it will consume scarce land,
water, labor and capital resources that would otherwise
have been invested in food production.
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With the objective of stabilizing domestic prices, countries
may sometimes impose export bans, export restrictions
and export taxes on food products. While this may
stabilize prices domestically and in the short term, it has
been shown to substantially increase food prices globally
and, especially, for countries heavily dependent on
imports [17,28]. In the lead up to the 2008 price spike, Ar-
gentina, Russia, Ukraine, Kazakhstan and India imposed
wheat export restrictions. Export restrictions for wheat
and rice are widely considered a primary cause of the price
spike [5]. It is estimated that elimination of export restric-
tions would reduce grain-price surges by as much as 30
percent [9]. There would seem to be a greater degree of
consensus that export restrictions, as opposed to other
proposed causes, drive food price volatility.
Droughts
In the lead up to the 2008 price spike, the world experi-
enced some climatic events which significantly lowered
production. For example, in the lead up to the price spike,
droughts in Australia saw wheat production fall some 56
per cent between 2000 and 2007 [39]. This had an effect
on global markets since Australia is the world’s second lar-
gest wheat exporter, accounting for 15 per cent of wheat
trade on the world market [40]. Poor growing conditions
were also experienced in the United States, Russia and
Ukraine [28]. There would seem to be relatively strong
consensus among researchers that weather patterns can
exacerbate food price volatility. However, the magnitude
of the impact at the global scale is unclear. There have
been few attempts to analyze lead-lag relationships in glo-
bal environmental variables and food prices.
Income growth, especially in India and China
Both the Indian and Chinese economies experienced
rapid growth in the decades preceding the 2008 price
spike. There is a view that income growth in these coun-
tries led to changing patterns of food consumption, with
a shift towards proteins and some vegetables, which
fueled a global food price surge [41]. Meat requires
greater quantities of land, energy and other resource
inputs to produce the same calorific value as rice, soy-
beans or grains. However, there is some debate about
the extent to which income and demand growth has
buoyed prices. Some researchers reject this theory be-
cause they argue India and China have long been self
sufficient in food. China imported less wheat in 2000 to
2007 (33.8 million tons) than in the proceeding eight
years (40.3 million tons) [28]. However, China has rap-
idly increased other food imports. Soybean imports in
China increased sharply during the lead up to the 2008
price surge. China imported 181 million tons of soy-
beans during 2000 to 2007 compared to 32 million tonsin the proceeding eight years [1]. The increased demand
would have impacted global soybean prices. The OECD
and FAO observe that strong income growth in China,
India and other rapidly developing economies is shaping
commodity markets and will be a permanent factor in-
fluencing price [14].
Depreciation in the US dollar
It has been shown that depreciation of the US dollar
increases commodity prices with an elasticity between
0.5 and 1.0 [42,43]. This is because the majority of com-
modity exchanges are denoted in US currency. During
2002 to 2008, the US dollar depreciated by 35 percent
against the Euro. If 0.75 is taken as the midpoint elasti-
city, depreciation of the US dollar contributed 20 per-
cent to rising food prices between 2002 and 2008 [44].
There is relatively strong consensus that exchange rate
movements are important factors impacting food prices.
However, the impact of exchange rate movements on
commodity prices overall remains hard to quantify and
some researchers argue that depreciation of the dollar
has not been sufficiently large or far reaching to be a
major contributing factor [12,45].
Urbanization
During 1975 to 2009, the world urban population grew
at an average annual rate of 2.4 percent compared to the
rural population which grew at 0.85 percent. These rates
are forecast to be 1.76 and 0.12 percent during 2009 to
2025 [2]. Urbanization is impacting food production via
the conversion of productive arable land into towns and
cities. The rate of urbanization is particularly rapid in
China. It is estimated that 6.72 million hectares, or 5.1
percent of China’s total arable land, was lost to industrial
or urban purposes during the seven-year period 1996 to
2003 [41]. However, urbanization is a gradual and on-
going process present during the previous and forthcom-
ing centuries. While urbanization is likely to place
upward pressure on food prices, it is unlikely to cause
sudden price surges or price volatility.
Speculation on food commodity futures markets
There is considerable debate about whether or not
speculation on food commodities markets exacerbates
food price surges. Most economists and financial ana-
lysts agree that speculation cannot drive prices up in the
long run – over a decade or more [46]. However, there
is a possibility it may impact short-term price move-
ments. Some lead-lag studies suggest that speculation
places upward pressure on food price volatility. One
study found that unexpected increases in futures trading
volumes leads to a subsequent increase in cash price
volatility for most commodities [47]. A similar lead-lag
study by the International Food Policy Research Institute
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“might” have been influential in the 2008 price spike,
but suggests further research is needed [48]. A recent
price dynamic model by the New England Complex Sys-
tems Institute involving a statistical analysis of price data
and futures trades finds that price peaks in 2008 and
2011 are “specifically due to investor speculation” [36].
Other researchers argue there is “compelling” evidence
that the recently expanded food-commodity derivatives
market led to speculative investment leading to increases
in global prices in excess of normal supply–demand
forces [49]. However, there are opposing perspectives.
Some suggest futures markets may have exacerbated
price volatility but are unlikely to be a leading cause and
there is little evidence to support the link between
futures markets and “real” supply-and-demand factors
[28]. A stronger position argues that speculation is often
unfairly attacked during periods of increased market
volatility and that the “bubble” argument for high food
prices “does not withstand close scrutiny” [50]. There is
also a view that speculation has positive impacts by fa-
cilitating smooth functioning of global food markets and
stabilizing trade [51].
Oil price rises
World food prices and world oil prices move in unison.
It has been observed that modern agriculture uses land
to convert petroleum into food [52,53]. One estimate
suggests that industrialized farming systems use 10 cal-
ories of fossil fuel to produce 1 calorie of food energy
[54,55]. Therefore, a rise in crude oil prices typically
increases the cost of food production, steepens the sup-
ply curve, and increases food prices [24]. An analysis of
crude oil and commodity price data from 1965 to 2005
finds that a 10 percent increase in the crude oil price
leads to a 3.3 percent increase in fertilizer cost and a 1.8
percent increase in food price [56].
Climate change, water scarcity and future food
prices
Climate change and water scarcity have the potential to
place significant upward pressure on food prices, and in-
crease price volatility, over the coming decades. Both
warrant special attention because they have the capabil-
ity to impose fundamental constraints on the world’s
ability to produce food. Climate change and water scar-
city impact all the variables in the food price systems
model (Figure 3). Furthermore, there is considerable un-
certainty about the extent that climate change and water
scarcity will impact food production systems.
Prior research establishes a clear and unambiguous link
between localized climate extremes, such as droughts and
floods, local food security and local food prices. The 1998
flood in Bangladesh created a shortfall of 2.2 million tonsof rice production leading to a price surge harming vul-
nerable households [57]. Cyclone Larry in North Queens-
land in 2006 destroyed large plantations leading to a 400
percent price increase for bananas across Australia [58]. It
is estimated that food costs in Louisiana increased by 11.5
percent following hurricane Katrina in 2005 [59].
There is also an established link between global cli-
mate patterns and food price volatility [60]. Droughts in
Australia and poor growing conditions in Russia, the
United States and the Ukraine over several years signifi-
cantly contributed to the 2008 spike in global wheat
prices [28]. The El Niño-Southern Oscillation (ENSO)
cycle is associated with global climatic extremes, such as
flooding and drought. A one-standard deviation change
in ENSO is associated with a commodity price inflation
of 3.5 to 4 percentage points and ENSO accounts for al-
most 20 percent of commodity price movements over
several years [61]. A study of the south-eastern agricul-
tural regions of the United States finds that ENSO
phases explain an average shift of US $212 million or
25.9 percent of the value of corn production in that re-
gion [62]. A study of Florida’s agricultural regions found
lower yields of tomatoes, bell peppers, sweet corn and
snap beans and higher prices for bell peppers and snap
beans during El Niño as opposed to La Niña winters
[62]. However, the impact of ENSO on the macroecon-
omy is less clear. An examination of co-cyclicality of
ENSO and inflation and economic growth within the US
economy from 1984 to 1999 reveals that ENSO had no
discernable impact on the gross domestic product [63].
While the link between extreme climate events and
food prices, both regionally and globally, has been iden-
tified through prior research, the link between human
induced climate change (that is, the greenhouse effect)
and global food prices is not yet known. One study esti-
mates that between 5 million and 170 million additional
people will be at risk of hunger by 2080 due to climate
change [64]. This study also suggests extreme weather
under climate change scenarios is likely to destabilize
food production, but the researchers do not report
quantitative estimates. It is worth noting that the
impacts of climate change on food production may not
be universally negative. Some areas of the world will ex-
perience changed rainfall patterns and more favorable
growing conditions. However, the aggregate global crop
production is likely to decrease [65].
The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
(IPCC) Fourth Assessment notes that current models
used to quantify the impacts on food security [66,67] do
not yet cover potential changes in the stability of food
supplies. The link to food price volatility is not men-
tioned. There are calls for new assessment methods that
place climate change into the context of other factors
which drive food prices [68].
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national Water Management Institute (IWMI) reveals
the extent of this dilemma [69] (p10). It estimated that
1.2 billion people live in regions with insufficient water
to meet human needs. It is also estimated that 1.6 billion
people live in water-scarce river basins with inadequate
financial and human capacity to develop future water
resources. The demands on limited water resources will
increase as the world population grows, emerging econ-
omies industrialize and new cities are built. This will
place more pressure on water needed for agriculture.
Water is a non-substitutable input for many forms of
agricultural production. Agriculture currently uses 70
per cent of the world’s water [69]. The IWMI describe a
scenario involving a 40 percent increase in the withdra-
wals of water for agriculture to feed a growing popula-
tion by 2050 [70]. Combined modeling by IFPRI and
IWMI predicts that under a water crisis scenario, where
supply falls well short of demand, crop prices will be 1.8
times greater than business-as-usual for rice, 1.7 times
for potatoes, 1.6 times for soybeans and more than
double for all other crops by 2025 [70]. If this scenario
occurs, water scarcity will be a primary driver of food
price increases. The solutions to water scarcity have
been explored by the IWMI and include changes in gov-
ernance, agricultural production systems and investment
in infrastructure [70].Can Cannes work?
Food price volatility, price increases and food security are
firmly established as high priority issues for the G20 and
national governments. At their summit in November
2010, the G20 leaders requested a collection of global
agencies to examine policy options. The findings were
published in June 2011 in a report identifying 10 recom-
mendations by the Food and Agriculture Organization,
the International Fund for Agricultural Development, the
International Monetary Fund, the Organization for Eco-
nomic Cooperation and Development, the United Nations
Conference on Trade and Development, the World Food
Program, the World Bank, the World Trade Organization,
the International Food Policy Research Institute and the
United Nations High Level Task Force [10].
The matter was given attention at the first Agriculture
Ministers meeting in Paris on 22 and 23 June 2011 with
subsequent adoption of the “Action Plan on Food Price
Volatility and Agriculture” [71]. Later, at the G20
Cannes Summit on 3 and 4 November 2011, the G20
annexed a declaration [72] to implement five objectives
of the action plan [73] as listed below. In this section,
we discuss some of the challenges and capability require-
ments relating to implementation of the five objectives
in the action plan by the global community.Improving agricultural production and productivity
Based on assumptions about population growth, chan-
ging diets and agricultural systems, the FAO forecasts
that food production needs to increase by 70 percent by
the year 2050 to meet demand. This includes growth in
annual cereal production from 2.1 billion tons to 5.1 bil-
lion tons and meat production from 200 million tons to
470 million tons [74]. To tackle food price surges, pro-
duction systems must also become more resilient with
greater diversification and an ability to handle external
shocks. Arguably the most effective long-term defense
against food price increases is building a resilient, effi-
cient and diversified agricultural sector.
Public expenditure on agricultural production systems
in developing countries worldwide has increased from
US $111.8 billion in 1980 to US $225.6 billion in 2002
[75]. When compared to world population growth, in-
come growth and increasing food demand over the same
period, the growth in expenditure is modest at best. Fur-
thermore, the effectiveness of this expenditure is widely
debated and researchers have identified numerous pol-
icies and strategies to achieve better outcomes [76,77].
Some economic studies conclude the world is chronic-
ally under-investing in research and development to im-
prove agricultural production systems [78]. Following a
period of “stagnation” during the 1990s, investment in
agricultural research and development in Sub-Saharan
Africa increased by 20 percent over the period from
2001 to 2008. However, the growth in expenditure oc-
curred in only a few countries and investment in many
other countries within the region has fallen to danger-
ously low levels [79]. It is estimated that developing
countries need to invest US $9.2 trillion over the 44-year
period from 2007 to 2050 to meet the FAO baseline
agricultural outlook [80].
In the current world economic climate with the G20
and other nations burdened by high debt levels and do-
mestic austerity measures, the discovery of new funds
for agricultural development will be challenging. This
heightens the importance of targeting. Increased, and
better targeted investments are needed because
improved production systems may be the most effective
long-term approach to food price stabilization. In
addition to the economic challenges, the world faces
climate change and water scarcity dilemmas. As yet
there is no convincing means by which food production
can increase by 70 percent, taking into account all
environmental, technological and institutional con-
straints. In order to achieve this objective, the G20 and
other national governments need to invest more
resources in agriculture and food production. The world
also needs better information about where, how and
when to spend money to improve agricultural produc-
tion capabilities.
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One of the main actions to occur under this objective is
the creation of an agricultural market information sys-
tem (AMIS), which was launched in December 2011
[81]. The basic premise is that better information will
lead to wiser investment choices and more stable mar-
kets. Information can also limit irrational speculation
and panic buying associated with price bubbles. Most
economists would agree that the provision of accurate
information and transparency improves the functioning
of markets. In addition to AMIS, the G20 describes
other information tools, including the use of satellite re-
mote sensing to forecast crop yields, famine early warn-
ing systems and vulnerability mapping. For example, the
G20 declaration notes the "Global Agricultural Geo-
monitoring Initiative", which will use satellite remote
sensing for enhanced crop production projections [72].
As the databases develop, there is a parallel require-
ment to develop integrated social, economic and envir-
onmental systems models. Many of the required models
exist but most are focused on components and subsys-
tems of the food price and food security system. Linkage
of these models from different systems and scales has
the capacity to improve understanding of interactions
among social, economic and biophysical systems [82,83].
Such approaches may assist in the understanding of how
global price changes impact domestic prices and also es-
tablish understanding of the mechanisms by which food
price surges translate into hunger and malnutrition. An
example of one effort to achieve this comes from the
Agricultural Model Intercomparison and Improvement
Project [84]. Commencing in March 2011, this project
draws together agronomic and economic models into a
common framework to explore the impact of future cli-
mate change on food security.
Another interesting angle involves the use of social
media, online content and automated text searching and
interpretation algorithms to forecast future food security
conditions. The United Nations Global Pulse project
commenced in 2009 [85]. This initiative uses real-time
information sourced from the internet to predict global
crises and inform decision makers about the best ways
to proactively respond. Forecasting food price surges,
and food insecurity, is an important area of activity for
the Global Pulse initiative. The Global Pulse e-bread ini-
tiative uses “web scraping” algorithms to record and in-
terpret monthly bread prices from online retailers. These
data can potentially forecast future price movements
[86]. The rapidly expanding fields of data mining, text
analysis and sentiment analysis attack the challenge of
forecasting price movements via a markedly different ap-
proach to conventional econometric models. This cre-
ates the possibility of new insights. Another recent
initiative called Planetary Skin [87,88] makes use ofremote sensing data combined with other datasets to
analyze and forecast environmental trends. Innovations
in mixing satellite data with other environmental re-
source and socio-economic data at the global scale could
provide new capabilities for forecasting food security
crises.
The development of improved market information is
tractable and is already occurring. There is solid eco-
nomic theory supporting the notion that improved, and
more transparent, information leads to better function-
ing markets. However, to realize the benefits of rich data
relating to agricultural markets and production, there
will be a requirement for a new generation of systems
models. As the amount of data expands rapidly, some of
the best insights into food price movements and food se-
curity may be obtained via the development of innova-
tive ways to combine and interpret the data.
Reducing the effects of price volatility for the most
vulnerable
This objective refers to a range of defensive measures,
including food aid, safety nets, financial risk manage-
ment, and capacity development for vulnerable coun-
tries. In crisis situations, where people face starvation,
food aid and safety nets are the primary means to miti-
gate harm. Researchers have identified the need to im-
prove both these policy mechanisms.
Food aid represents less than 0.2 percent of total world
food production [89]. Therefore, food aid has a minor
impact on global food prices and food security. However,
it can make a significant difference at the margin and
can stabilize prices within localized geographic regions.
During 1988 to 2009, global emergency food aid deliver-
ies grew from 2.2 to 4.2 million tons [90]. The critical
requirement for food aid effectiveness is targeting [91].
Prior studies present evidence of ineffective targeting
where food aid fails to reach a country’s most needy,
food insecure, citizens [92]. Bilateral food aid has been
shown to be poorly targeted, and less effective, than
multilateral food aid, which has a counter-cyclical and
stabilizing impact on food prices [93]. There are many
calls to upgrade global food aid systems. A recent review
argues that “existing international mechanisms govern-
ing food aid are dysfunctional and outdated” [89]. The
researchers conducting this review propose a Global
Food Aid Compact which would be more inclusive of re-
cipient countries, specify donor commitments, contain
monitoring and enforcement mechanisms and a compul-
sory code of conduct. There are some positive signals. A
recent study shows that since the 1990s donors have be-
come increasingly responsive to recipient countries ex-
periencing violent conflict [94].
In addition to food aid are safety nets. A safety net
may be defined as “some form of income insurance to
Hajkowicz et al. Agriculture & Food Security 2012, 1:8 Page 9 of 12
http://www.agricultureandfoodsecurity.com/content/1/1/8help people through short-term stress and calamities”
(p90) [95]. Safety nets are a widely used and effective
mechanism to protect vulnerable persons against malnu-
trition and starvation. However, safety nets may also
have negative consequences when they are not designed
or deployed properly. Ideally, a safety net provides pro-
tection during a short term crisis while building long
term food self-sufficiency and resilience. Three case
studies from southern Africa finds that even ‘tiny’ in-
come transfers are invested by recipients in education,
social networks and the acquisition of productive assets
[96]. This tends to suggest that safety nets can protect
the poor from price volatility while building longer term
self-sufficiency.
To succeed in this objective of the G20 action plan, and
protect vulnerable persons, the world needs to achieve
better targeting, and overall management, of food aid [97].
To achieve better targeting the FAO [98] identifies three
policy priorities involving improved food security assess-
ments; better ongoing monitoring and needs assessment
and; improved governance at global, national and regional
levels. While considerable work is underway, these policy
gaps remain and will act as barriers to improved targeting
of food and safety nets until addressed.
Strengthening international policy coordination
The inclusion of this objective implies the current institu-
tional arrangements need strengthening and better coord-
ination. Episodic breakdown in national and regional food
production systems and subsequent food price instability
can often be traced back to poor governance [99].
Attempts to improve governance with a view to ensuring
food security are widespread [100] and much research has
been published on the topic [101]. A large number of
international agencies, national overseas aid agencies,
charities and domestic governments are active in the food
security space. There is no lack of interest. However, the
problem of price volatility and food insecurity is worsen-
ing. An emerging problem will be coordination. To ad-
dress this, there is a requirement for studies into global
level institutions to identify gaps and redundancies. As yet
there are few comprehensive institutional maps of food
price volatility relevant organizations.
Another important knowledge requirement relates to
trade liberalization. The G20 action plan states support
for the conclusion of the Doha Development Round “to
a successful, ambitious, comprehensive and balanced
conclusion, consistent with its mandate” (p 10/24) [71].
Global agricultural markets are distorted by barriers to
trade and production subsidies. From some perspectives,
international adoption of free trade through World
Trade Organization (WTO) negotiations is the most ef-
fective policy mechanism for improving food security
[11]. This perspective rests on the argument that freemarket forces are an effective mechanism for ensuring
food supply responds swiftly to demand and, thereby,
stabilizes prices and reduces hunger. Economists have
greater consensus on the price volatility impacts of cer-
tain market distortions and less so on others.
Export and import restrictions are market distortions
widely agreed to exacerbate global food price surges.
Trust and cooperation between countries are prerequi-
sites for the management of export restrictions. This
opens the question about whether food export restric-
tions should be handled under future WTO agreements.
Neither current nor proposed WTO agreements cover
agricultural export restrictions [5]. The International
Food Policy Research Institute considers this to be the
correct approach. They recommend that instead of using
WTO mechanisms the international community should
form ad hoc forums to establish a code of conduct [9].
This would help build trust and cooperation critical for
the management of food export restrictions. Others sug-
gest that formalization of free trade via the WTO is the
best approach [11].
There have been many attempts to examine the
impacts of trade liberalization on food prices and secur-
ity. A study of food grain markets in India revealed that
removal of barriers to trade, such as export restrictions,
decreased price volatility domestically [102]. However, a
stochastic dynamic programing model for Southern Af-
rica revealed that regional food prices were more volatile
in the absence of government intervention in agricul-
tural markets [103]. Another study of the rice trade be-
tween India and Bangladesh finds liberalized trade
improves food security for vulnerable people [104].
Some research cautions against moving too far in the
direction of free trade given the success of many Asian
governments in achieving price stabilization, and food
security, via market interventions [105].
A better understanding of the pathways to liberalized
trade will increase the chances of the G20 action plan
succeeding in its objective to mitigate the negative con-
sequences of food price volatility.Improving the functioning of agricultural commodity
derivatives markets
Governments can reduce harmful speculation in agricul-
tural commodity futures markets via regulatory controls
and the provision of information. Regulatory controls limit
the volume of futures trades. One form of such regulation
involves increasing margin deposits on futures trades,
therefore, increasing the risk, and reducing the prevalence
of, speculation. Limiting the positions of traders may also
have a calming effect on markets [9]. The provision of in-
formation and requirements for transparency can also
limit harmful speculation and can reduce market
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both these dimensions.
The impact of speculation in derivatives markets on
commodity price movements is heavily contested. Further
research is required to establish a stronger evidence base.
Some economists argue there is no convincing reason to
link market speculation to the price surges of recent times
[50,51]. A contrary story is emerging from empirical stud-
ies involving lead-lag analyses of trading and price data
[36,47,48]. These studies are showing us that speculative
activity on markets is linked to increased price volatility
and significantly contributes to price surges.
The need to provide better information and transpar-
ency about markets is widely supported and through
initiatives such as AMIS is well underway. A key ques-
tion for policy makers is whether to regulate or not to
regulate. The G20 action plan does not prescribe regula-
tion but rather “strongly encourage(s) G20 Finance Min-
isters and Central Bank Governors to take the
appropriate decisions for a better regulation and super-
vision of agricultural financial markets” [71] (p14). If
there is no link between speculation and food price
surges then regulation may be costly and hamper the
smooth functioning of agricultural markets. However, if
there is a link, then regulation of speculation may be an
effective means of reducing price surges and protecting
vulnerable people. Which pathway is more risk averse?
Given the severity and urgency of the food price crisis
some researchers suggest that in the absence of conclu-
sive evidence well designed regulations are the more
prudent, and risk averse, way forward [36].
Conclusion
We conclude that the five G20 Cannes objectives can be
effective, but some major innovations are required by
the global community. Perhaps the most important shift
relates to a renewed recognition by the global commu-
nity about the importance of the agricultural sector. For
many developed economies, agriculture has shrunk over
the past century to a few percent of gross domestic
product while other sectors, especially services, have
risen rapidly. Investment in agriculture in developing
countries is widely considered inadequate. However,
many of the solutions to food insecurity, global warming
and biodiversity loss lie within the agricultural sector
[106]. The growing global population, rising food prices
and widespread hunger may lead to a resurgence of pol-
icy focus on agriculture.
As recognized by the establishment of the Millennium
Development Goals, the world is in a long-term food se-
curity crisis in which hunger and malnutrition afflict a
significant proportion of the global population. Food
price spikes exacerbate this crisis. Urgent action is
required, but the knowledge base is currently inadequatefor the development of low risk, high benefit policy
interventions. Trends, such as urbanization, agricultural
development, improved transportation systems, chan-
ging diets and income growth in Asia, are leading to
people’s increased reliance on global and regional mar-
kets for food provision. This means that price move-
ments can significantly impact hunger and malnutrition
rates. Despite much effort over recent decades, the re-
search community is still unraveling the causes, conse-
quences and responses to price surges. A solution
requires deep and far reaching change in food produc-
tion and distribution systems and the governance frame-
works that surround them.
While actions need to be taken immediately, there is a
requirement for a parallel effort to build a more robust
knowledge base and improved analytic capabilities. His-
tory is replete with examples of how well intended inter-
ventions in markets lead to damaging outcomes,
sometimes worse than the original problem being solved.
While the current global food production and distribution
system is unsatisfactory, it still manages to feed six out of
every seven humans. The increasing calls for fundamental
and far reaching redesign so we can sustainably feed seven
out of seven humans are warranted. However, it would be
disastrous if changes to food supply systems worsened the
ratio. Without knowledge of how a system responds we
always risk side effects that could be worse than the prob-
lem being solved. Better knowledge and improved capabil-
ities, alongside immediate actions, will help the G20
action plan achieve its objectives.
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